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**An analytical framework for cyber security**



<b>Report Documentation Page</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
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1. REPORT DATE <b>07 NOV 2011</b>	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011</b>		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>An analytical framework for cyber security</b>		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
		5b. GRANT NUMBER		
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
		5e. TASK NUMBER		
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),Information Innovation Office,3701 North Fairfax Drive,Arlington,VA,22203-1714</b>		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>Presented at the Colloquium on Future Directions in Cyber Security on November 7, 2011, Arlington, VA.</b>				
14. ABSTRACT				
15. SUBJECT TERMS				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>Same as Report (SAR)</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>23</b>
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>		

# An analytical framework for cyber security

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November 2011





# What we hear.

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# Attackers penetrate the architecture easily...

## Goal

- Demonstrate asymmetric ease of exploitation of DoD computer versus efforts to defend.

## Result

- Multiple remote compromises of fully security compliant and patched HBSS‡ computer within days:
  - 2 remote accesses.
  - 25+ local privilege escalations.
  - Undetected by host defenses.

**Hijacked web page**

**Infected .pdf document**

**HBSS Workstation Penetration Demonstration**

**Total Effort:** 2 people, 3 days, \$18K

**HBSS Costs:** Millions of dollars a year for software and licenses alone (not including man hours)

‡ = Host Based Security System (HBSS)

# Users are the weak link...



Finweb = Jane123  
DTS = 123Jane  
PKI = JaneA123  
DiskCrypt = Jane123A  
Gmail = Jane123A

# The supply chain is potentially compromised...


Approximately 3500 ICs.

- 200 unique chip types.
- 208 field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).
- 64 FPGA and 9 ASIC types across 12 subsystems.


78% of FPGAs and 66% of ASICs manufactured in China and Taiwan.




JSF FPGA & ASIC Usage



FPGA Manufacture Location



ASIC Manufacture Location



A4 Nation

s

219180096  
The Washington Post

SATURDAY, JANUARY 16, 2010

## U.S. plans to issue official protest to China over attack on Google

BY ELLEN NAKASHIMA

The United States will issue an official protest to the Chinese government over a major espionage attack targeting Google's computer systems and rights activists' e-mail accounts that the search-engine giant said originated in China.

"We will be issuing a formal demarche in the coming days," said a spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. "The Chinese government has been given a clear choice: either they will stop this attack or we will issue an official protest."

The spokesman did not say when the protest would be issued or who would be involved.

**Chinese cyber attack: "Highly sophisticated and targeted attack" on Google corporate infrastructure (known as Aurora)**

cident" and seek an explanation, he said. The move may signal a shift for an administration that has been reluctant, according to China experts, to press sensitive issues such as human rights, lest it offend a country whose cooperation it seeks in other areas.

On Tuesday, in a rare disclosure by a major firm, Google announced that its "corporate infrastructure" had been hacked and

Google, were affected.

Google also said it will no longer filter Internet searches on its Chinese search engine, [Google.cn](http://Google.cn). Although it did not directly accuse China, the Silicon Valley technology titan threatened to pull out of the country if the government does not allow it to operate uncensored. Chinese officials said that their laws ban hacking and that China's Internet is open,

day. She is expected to allude to the incident. "When she talks about this issue, China will be one of the countries she points to," an administration official said.

"You couldn't have picked a worse company to hack if you wanted to not irritate the Americans," said James A. Lewis, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Google is their favorite child, and they advise President Obama on technology, and its innovations are seen as the next big thing that will drive the economy."

Officials said the administration has raised concerns about cybersecurity and Internet freedom with China before. But by formally protesting to the Chinese, the United States is elevating the issues to a new level, policy experts said. Richard N. Rosenberg, director of the Project

said his analysis of results from a technology firm investigating the attacks suggests that they "were not state-sponsored or the work of an elite, sophisticated group such as the Chinese military."

Nonetheless, said Sophie Richardson, Asia advocacy director for Human Rights Watch, "China's

Small group of academics took control of a car using Bluetooth and OnStar. They were able to disable the brakes, control the accelerator, and turn on the interior microphone.<sup>[1]</sup>




False speedometer reading  
Note that the car is in park...

[1] K. Koscher, et al. "Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile," in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 16-19, 2010.



We are doing a lot, but we are losing ground...

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[1] GAO analysis of US-CERT data.  
GAO-12-137 Information Security: Weaknesses Continue  
Amid New Federal Efforts to Implement Requirements


[2] INPUT reports 2006 – 2010



# Why?

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
# We are divergent with the threat...



\* Public sources of malware averaged over 9,000 samples (collection of exploits, worms, botnets, viruses, DoS tools)

# User patterns are exploitable...

A recent Defcon contest challenged participants to crack 53,000 passwords.  
In 48 hours, the winning team had 38,000.





# Additional security layers often create vulnerabilities...

## October 2010 vulnerability watchlist

Vulnerability Title	Fix Avail?	Date Added
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability	No	8/25/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Denial of Service Vulnerability	Yes	8/24/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Buffer Overflow Vulnerability	No	8/20/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Sanitization Bypass Weakness	No	8/18/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Security Bypass Vulnerability	No	8/17/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Multiple Security Vulnerabilities	Yes	8/16/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Remote Code Execution Vulnerability	No	8/16/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Use-After-Free Memory Corruption Vulnerability	No	8/12/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Remote Code Execution Vulnerability	No	8/10/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Multiple Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities	No	8/9/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability	Yes	8/8/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Security-Bypass Vulnerability	No	8/8/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Multiple Security Vulnerabilities	No	8/8/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Buffer Overflow Vulnerability	No	7/29/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Remote Privilege Escalation Vulnerability	No	7/28/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Cross Site Request Forgery Vulnerability	No	7/26/2010
XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX Multiple Denial Of Service Vulnerabilities	No	7/22/2010

6 of the  
vulnerabilities  
are in security  
software

Color Code Key:    Vendor Replied – Fix in development    Awaiting Vendor Reply/Confirmation    Awaiting CC/S/A use validation

# These layers increase the attack surface...


Constant surface area available to attack

Regardless of the application size, the system loads the same number of support functions.

DLLs: run-time environment  
= more commonality


Application specific functions

For every 1,000 lines of code, 1 to 5 bugs are introduced.





# We amplify the effect by mandating uniform architectures





The US approach to cyber security is dominated by a strategy that layers security on to a uniform architecture.

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We do this to create tactical breathing space, but it is not convergent with an evolving threat.



Technology is not the only culprit... nor the only answer.

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## There are multiple choices for addressing the supply chain vulnerability:

- Resort to manufacturing all chips in trusted foundries.  
This is not feasible or sustainable.
- Screen all chips in systems critical to National Security or our economic base.  
Despite recent advances in screening technology, this is not feasible, affordable, or sustainable at the scales required.


Process	Trusted Design and Untrusted FAB			Untrusted Design ASIC			Untrusted Design FPGA		
	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
$P_D$	90.0%	99.0%	99.9%	80.0%	90.0%	99.0%	90.0%	99.0%	99.9%
$P_{FA}$	$10^{-3}$	$10^{-5}$	$10^{-7}$	$10^{-3}$	$10^{-4}$	$10^{-6}$	$10^{-3}$	$10^{-5}$	$10^{-6}$
# of Transistors Evaluated	$10^5$	$10^6$	$10^8$	$10^5$	$10^6$	$10^8$	$10^5$	$10^6$	$10^7$
Time to Evaluate*	480 H	240 H	120 H	480 H	240 H	120 H	480 H	240 H	120 H

- 3,500 IC's on the F-35
- Single FPGA = 400 million transistors
- Modern chips = 2.5 billion transistors

**Selective screening coupled with diplomatic sanctions may create new solutions that are both feasible and sustainable.**

**Understanding them in the context of 'game theory' reveals the problem.**

Bot Herder strategy example:



Bot Herder Cost	Bot Herder Return		Antivirus Cost	Antivirus Return
	Short	Long		
Small	High	High	Low	High
Small	High	0	High	Low

**The security layering strategy and antitrust has created cross incentives that contribute to divergence.**

† = "exclusive or" logical operation

\* = Advanced Encryption Standard



# Layering and uniformity have created unintended consequences... we are in need of new choices...

## Examples:

Belief	Approach	Example	Unintended consequence
Defense in depth	Uniform, layered network defense	Host Based Security System	Larger attack surface introduces more areas of exploitability for attackers... Homogeneous targets that amplify effects...
Users are best line of defense	Operator hygiene	15 character password	Users take short cuts and become enemy assets...
The interplay of technology, policy, incentives will favor better security.	Antitrust law rulings, use of COTS	Competition and independence in security software and COTS	Cross incentives that undermine security

## We need new choices that create:

Users as the best line of defense without impeding operations.

Layered defense without increasing surface area for attack.

Heterogeneous systems that are inherently manageable.



We missed it too...

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...let's fix it.

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# Cyber Colloquium

#DARPACyber